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Abstract
The principal-agent relationships exist between the 
administrative institutions and the civil servants as well 
as the administrative leaders and the civil servants when 
the administrative power is exercised. Given the condition 
that the assigned civil servants are fully equipped with 
the corresponding professional qualification, this paper 
analyses the constraints from the clients and agents 
in those two relationships inside the administration 
institution, then drawing the conclusion that the illegal 
administration of civil servants is largely influenced by 
their leaders’ judgment of the essence of the legislation. 
We, therefore, should increase the civil servants’ salary, 
improve the assessment and promotion system, strengthen 
the legal awareness and ability of administrative leaders 
and intensify the external administrative supervision and 
the right restriction. 
The illegal administration of civil servants refers 
to the violation of law and damage to the interests of 
the law-protected social relations when they are in the 
exercise of their power and in the performance of their 
duty. This would disrupt normal social order, pose a 
threat to the authority of the law, damage the public 
interests and government’s image as well as set a bad 
example for our people. Prevention on the occurrence 
of illegal administration is the continuing concern of the 
academic circle and related departments. The existing 
research is of great significance to the prevention of 
the violation of illegal administration since it mainly 
focuses on the formation, classification of responsibility 
and the construction of legal liability system of illegal 
administration. However, these studies seldom explore the 
mechanism of civil servants’ illegal administration from 
theoretical analysis, thus the countermeasure is weak. This 
paper attempts to apply the methodology of state space 
model into analyzing the mechanism of civil servants’ 
illegal administration in the exercise of administrative 
power so as to improve the responsible institution and 
reduce the occurrence of illegal administration. 
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The illegal administration of civil servants refers to 
the violation of law and damage to the interests of the 
law-protected social relations when they are in the 
exercise of their power and in the performance of their 
duty.1 This would disrupt normal social order, pose a 
threat to the authority of the law, damage the public 
1 According to the Civil Servant Law (2005), the civil servant 
refers to the employees who perform their duties according to 
the law and are thus incorporated into the national administrative 
staffing. In addition, their salary and welfare are afforded by the 
national finance. These employees are public servants and are 
thus incorporated into the national administrative staffing in CPC 
(Communist Party of China), NPC (the National People’s Congress), 
CPPCC (Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference), 
administrative institution, court, procuratorate, democratic parties 
institution, NGO (Non-Governmental Organization). To make 
it easier, civil servants referred in this paper is the non-leader 
employees who are incorporated into the administrative staffing 
and administrative leader is the one who has the power in decision-
making.
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interests and government’s image as well as set a bad 
example for our people. Prevention on the occurrence 
of illegal administration is the continuing concern of the 
academic circle and related departments. The existing 
research is of great significance to the prevention of 
the violation of illegal administration since it mainly 
focuses on the formation, classification of responsibility 
and the construction of legal liability system of illegal 
administration. However, these studies seldom explore the 
mechanism of civil servants’ illegal administration from 
theoretical analysis, thus the countermeasure is weak. This 
paper attempts to apply the methodology of state space 
model into analyzing the mechanism of civil servants’ 
illegal administration in the exercise of administrative 
power so as to improve the responsibility institution and 
reduce the occurrence of illegal administration. 
1 .  T H E  P R I N C I P A L - A G E N T 
R E L AT I O N S H I P  I N  E X E R C I S I N G 
ADMINISTRATION RIGHT
In the economic sense, any transaction that involves 
asymmetric information belongs to the principal-agent 
relationship, of which the agent has absolutely advantage 
in information controlling while the client does not. Under 
this relationship, the two parties have a game relationship 
due to the inequilibrium information. The client wants 
to act for sake of his or her own interest. Meanwhile, the 
client cannot directly observe what behavior the agent 
has chosen but he can observe the behavior of the agent 
and the incomplete information resulted from the external 
stochastic factors. What the client is faced with is that 
how to design an incentive contract to allow the client to 
reward or punish the agent according to his observation 
of information’s complete degree so as to ensure the 
maximum benefit of the client.
The principal-agent relationship not only exists in the 
economic field, but also in all the cooperative activities 
as well as the management and administrative authority 
in any institution. The exercise of administrative power is 
a cooperative activity which also includes the principal-
agent relationship. The function of administrative power 
is composed of the whole process of its production, 
exercise and result. According to the principle of popular 
sovereignty, the power of our nation is granted by our 
people. In terms of the production of administrative 
power, which is a vital part of our nation’s power, it is thus 
also granted by our people. In China, the administration 
right is authorized to the administration institution by 
the supreme organization of our nation by means of 
legislation. The authorized administrative institution then 
subdivides the administrative rights to its subordinated 
organs according to Administrative Organization Law and 
Civil Service Law. In this way, the civil servant obtains 
his or her specific administrative right. Therefore, the 
principal-agent relationship comes into being between 
the administrative institution and civil servant through 
certain legal norms. On the one hand, the authority, duty 
as well as the administrative priority of administrative 
institution is performed by the civil servants; on the other 
hand, the civil servants should administrate in the name 
of this institution. The institution, in turn, assumes the 
legal responsibility for civil servant’s behavior. When it 
comes to the way the civil servant exercising his or her 
power, there is an asymmetric information line between 
them. The administrative institution is in disadvantage in 
information collection, so it is the client. The civil servant 
is in advantage, so he or she is the agent. This paper will 
refer to it as the first principal-agent relationship. 
According to Article 54 of the Civil Servant Law, 
civil servant shall carry out the decision and order from 
the leader excerpt for the wrong decision and illegal 
order. Hence, the law endows the right of order and 
command to the administrative leader. Administrative 
power is exercised by the civil servant and the leader’s 
leadership. Compared with the civil servant who is in 
charge of implementation, the administrative leader is in 
disadvantage in information. Therefore, the administrative 
leader and the civil servant form a second principal-agent 
relationship.
2. THEORETICAL BASIS FOR STATE 
SPACE MODEL
The methodology of state space model provides a 
profound theoretical framework for the principal-agent 
relationship in the administrative process. It was first 
used by Wilson and it is a model which includes the 
expected utility function of the principal, the participation 
constraint and incentive compatible constraint function of 
the agent. It is showed as follows:
The expected utility function of the principal:
(P)∫v(π(α,θ)-s(x(α,θ) ) )g(θ)d(θ) .
The participation constraint of the agent:
(IR)∫u(s(x(α,θ) )g(θ)d(θ)-c(α)≥ u- .
The incentive compatible constraint of the agent
            (IC)∫ u(s(x(α,θ) )g(θ)d(θ)-c(α)
                       ≥∫u(s(x(α',θ) )g(θ)d(θ)-c(α' ),??? α'??? A .
A-The combination of all the actions the agent can choose
α- One specific act of the agent, α??? A
α'-The act of agent α'≠α
θ- Stochastic variable free from the control of principal 
or agent
u-- The maximum expected utility of the agent refusing 
participation (also called reservation utility)
u(.)- The expected return function of the agent choosing 
one act
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u(.)-The expected utility function of the principal
c(.) - The anticipate cost function of the agent choosing 
one act
s(x) - An incentive contract determined by X and 
designed by the principal
x(α,θ) - An observable result determined both byα and θ
π(α,θ) - The production function determined both by α 
and θ, and the direct ownership belongs to the 
principal
g(θ) -The density function of Stochastic variable 
In this model, when the principal gives his offer, the 
agent has the right to accept or refuse. In order to satisfy 
the participation constraint of the agent (IR), the principal 
must meet the demands of the agent. Otherwise, the agent 
would refuse his offer. An example can be listed that if 
the judge and the lawyer undertake the same workload, 
the judge would resign his job and choose to be a lawyer 
when the salary of the former is lower than that of the 
latter. In addition, the principal should also fit in the 
incentive compatible constraint of the agent (IC), or 
else the agent’s action cannot guarantee to represent the 
principal’s interest. Only when IR and IC are both met 
with can the principal maximize his or her own expected 




Theoretically, the principal can design a set of effective 
incentive contracts to fit in the two condition of (IR) and 
(IC), including increasing the agent’s expected return 
of choosing one specific act (α), decreasing the agent’s 
expected return of choosing act (α'), or increasing the 
expected cost of choosing act (α'), reducing the expected 
cost of choosing one specific act (α). In this way, the agent 
will consciously choose one specific act (α) according to 
the principal’s interests. On the contrary, the agent would 
choose the act that is more beneficial to himself or herself 
instead of the principal.
As is mentioned above, the civil servant has power, 
duty and administrative priority in the first principal-
agent relationship and the administrative institution has 
the right to administrate and manage the civil servant. In 
order to make sure that the civil servant carries out the 
administrative and management activity according to 
the will of the related institution and reach certain goals, 
the administrative institution often adopts incentives, 
such as personal assessment, rewards or punishment and 
promotion opportunity. The corresponding institutional 
norms are the so-called incentive mechanisms, or 
incentive contracts in economic sense.
3.  THE MECHANISM BEHIND CIVIL 
SERVANT’S ILLEGAL ADMINISTRATION
At present, what incentive mechanism has been designed 
by administrative institution as a principal for civil 
servant? Does it meet with the two conditions of (IR) 
and (IC)? Why the civil servant’s illegal administration 
still happens? This paper will examine the incentive 
mechanism of civil servant, analyze the function of 
the incentive mechanism in practice and explain the 
mechanism behind civil servant’s illegal administration.
3.1 The Existing Incentive Mechanism and Its 
Function
Since the implementation of civil servant system, China 
has made great breakthroughs in the incentive mechanism 
and thus formed a relatively complete incentive 
mechanism system. Generally speaking, it entails four 
parts, the salary, the performance assessment, promotion 
opportunity and reward or punishment. The four incentive 
mechanisms and its functions will be elaborated as 
following.
3.1.1 The Salary Incentive Mechanism 
The salary of civil servant refers to the remuneration from 
the public service work. According to Article 74 of the 
Civil Servant Act, the salary of civil servant consists of 
two parts: Basic salary and allowance. As an incentive 
mechanism, the salary of civil servant should first meet 
the participation constraint of civil servant. That is to 
say, the salary should be a little bit higher or equal to that 
of the staff in an enterprise. The corresponding work of 
civil servant in government is equal to the manager in a 
company. After an empirical data analysis on comparing 
the salary of civil servants in the middle three provinces 
with that of the employees, some scholars points out that 
the salary of clerk and section-level civil servant is equal 
to that of general manager in a company, the remuneration 
of civil servants in the deputy county, prefectural county 
or county is commensurate with that of the department 
manager in an enterprise. This situation is basically in 
line with abroad where the general salary level of the 
civil servants is higher than those of the private sector. 
Apart from it, it is clear that the job of civil servant is 
very popular since enormous people take the examination 
of civil servant recruitment. Therefore, the salary of 
civil servant in our nation meets the basic demand of 
participation constraint.
This paper will further explore whether the salary 
of civil servant can fit in the condition of incentive 
compatible constraint, in other words, whether the salary 
can work as an incentive mechanism when the salary 
of a civil servant meets the demand for participation 
constraint.
The basic salary of civil servant is unified by our 
government and it entails two parts, the job salary and the 
salary according to different levels. Generally speaking, 
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there is not too much difference between them. The 
existing basic salary of civil servant accounts for 20% 
to 40% of the whole salary while the allowance takes 
up 60% to 80%. It is therefore noted that the allowance 
occupies a major proportion in civil servant salary. The 
realization of civil servant’s salary incentive mechanism 
function depends on the larger proportion of allowance. 
The allowance of civil servant refers to the additional 
regional allowance, remote area allowance, post 
allowance, housing and medical care allowance. At 
present, the allowance of civil servant mainly comes 
from the extra-budget revenue from different department, 
including the profits paid by the subordinate enterprises, 
the administration fees and the law enforcement economy. 
Compared with the manager in state-owned enterprises, 
the administrative institution has more administration 
power in affecting the extra-budget revenue. Therefore, 
the allowance in the administrative institution which 
has the practical power in setting up the allowance 
level is much higher than that of the institution which 
doesn’t have the power. The phenomenon “the power 
of department is used to maximize the benefit of the 
individuals in this department” is very common. Hence, it 
is easy to be noted that the civil servant in the same level 
is paid different salaries and the civil servants in the same 
city are paid different salaries. The empirical study shows 
that the difference in allowance leads to the difference in 
salary, which bypasses the difference in duty and work 
risks. If the salary cannot embody the value of labor 
and work risks, the civil servant’s incentive and work 
passion will be damped down, even leading to reverse 
incentive, triggering financial fraud, corruption and illegal 
administration. 
3.1.2 The Performance Assessment Incentive Mechanism
The performance assessment of civil servant is the 
appraisal and evaluation on the virtue, ability, diligence, 
achievement and integrity according to Civil Servant Law. 
It serves as an important basis for the administration of 
government personnel and for the civil servant’s salary, 
promotion, reward or punishment, training and dismissal. 
Based on Civil Servant Law and Rules on Civil Servant 
Performance Assessment (try-out), all departments have 
carried out the performance assessment on a regular basis 
through making corresponding detailed implementation 
rules and finding assessment methods according to their 
practical situation. In general, the performance assessment 
of civil servant entails four aspects: Evaluation, 
management, incentive and supervision, of which the 
incentive is the most important. In practice, however, 
due to the unscientific design of existing assessment 
standard, the incentive mechanism of this kind loses 
its function and, on the contrary, produces reverse 
incentive. Specifically speaking, the existing performance 
assessment mechanism has two major drawbacks: (a) The 
assessment standard is too general and lack of scientific 
rationality. The standard of assessment of the job 
description should be made clear. Nonetheless, the reality 
is that most administrative institutions don’t make it 
clear, and even few institutions make it, it is not specific, 
concrete enough. The responsibility is too blurred to 
reflect the job boundary. In essence, it is a very difficult 
thing to design a scientific and reasonable assessment 
standard for the blurred job boundary. The five aspects 
of virtue, ability, diligence, achievement and integrity are 
the basic assessment, which seems to be holistic but is 
hard to make it practical. If the performance assessment 
cannot reflect the actual performance of the civil servant, 
it would be meaningless. Though some administrative 
institutions have made the implementation details on 
performance assessment, the design of those details is too 
general to make the practical standard clear. The existing 
standard is lack of scientific rationality. (b) The reverse 
incentives are influenced greatly by the human factors. 
The leader’s personal will and human relations lead to 
the non-objectiveness of the assessment result because 
of the unspecific and unclear standard. This makes the 
performance assessment mechanism lose its function of 
incentive, and enables some civil servant attaches more 
importance to cater to the leader and colleagues instead of 
working hard.
3.1.3 The Promotion Opportunity Incentive Mechanism
The promotion of civil servant includes the promotion of 
duty and the promotion of rank, which means to higher the 
rank and enlarger the power. This will not only increase 
the salary and bring in economic return, but also enhance 
a sense of job satisfaction, which is the best way to inspire 
the civil servant. 
In order to ensure the fairness of the promotion and 
make the most of the incentive function, Civil Servant 
Law has made clear principles and procedures on the 
promotion of civil servant. Compared with traditional way 
of cadre promotion, the system of civil servant promotion 
is more solid, but there are some shortcomings:
(a) The procedure of promotion is manipulated by 
people, of which the will of the leader plays a dominating 
role. Although the Civil Servant Law has stipulated 
the specific procedure of the promotion, it is easy to 
be manipulated by the leader so as to make fully use 
of this legal procedure. The nomination of candidates 
is the key process of appointing the cadres. However, 
the main leaders and cadres negotiate firstly, and then 
decide the nomination of candidates. At last, it comes 
to the process of democratic recommendation. When 
the candidates are presupposed by the leaders, they 
usually lobby, canvass and promise to the people before 
the democratic recommendation, which will definitely 
exert a good impact on the voting result. In order to 
make the presupposed candidate enter the process of 
democratic recommendation, the leader always sets his 
tone, or let the host of meeting give verbal suggestion 
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in the recommendation meeting. During the process of 
the cadres inspection, the personnel department always 
inspect and evaluate according to the leader’s intension so 
as to provide favorable condition to allow the candidate 
to pass the inspection due to the inaccurate and unspecific 
assessment standard. In the end, the will of the leader 
would be transformed into collective will through 
the process of collective voting. Since the promotion 
procedure is manipulated by people, it goes against its 
original meanings and becomes only a white elephant.
Even empirical studies show that the will of the leaders 
plays a decisive role in the process of promoting the civil 
servant. Through analyzing the resumes of 40 top leaders 
in CPC and government, some scholars have found that 
the working experience of secretary or head of the office 
in CPC administration is most apt to get job promotion, 
which is mainly dependent on the will of the leaders. 
(b) The coexistence of the threshold on registration 
and the unclear standard. Opening selection changes 
the traditional appointment pattern. Up till now, it is a 
common mechanism for the promotion of civil servant 
that adds new and young blood to the administrative 
institutions and gains worldwide recognition from the 
public since it can encourage fair competition and prevent 
corruption. However, since the Civil Servant Law doesn’t 
make clear distinction on the open selection post, and the 
qualification of the candidates, the executor of the system 
and the candidates have much marginal space to operate. 
In reality, some administrative institutions even set up 
special threshold or tailored criterion for the presupposed 
candidates so as to push aside the excellent talents in 
the open selection procedure. Under the circumstance of 
unclear standard for promotion, it is usually the leader’s 
will which promotes the cadres. 
Overall, the existing promotion mechanism is greatly 
influenced by the personal will be of the leader. The 
function of incentive is limited. 
3.1.4 The Reward and Punishment Incentive Mechanism
Our national administrative institution reward the 
prominent hard-working civil servant who makes great 
contribution to his or her work and punish the illegal 
administration civil servant who violets the law according 
to the law of our country so as to erect the authority of 
the system and ensure the code of the conduct of civil 
servant.2
(a) The reward of civil servant is rather subjective and 
arbitrary. In terms of the real condition of civil servant’s 
reward or punishment, it is relatively general and abstract. 
In terms of the procedure, the reward proposal should 
2 Public functionaries discipline in this paper refers to the 
disciplinary act to the non-leader civil servants who violates 
the law or discipline or commits severe crime while exercising 
their function. They are required to face the legal consequence 
of administrative responsibility, civil liability and criminal 
responsibility.
be firstly agreed by the public in the administration 
institution area, then permitted by the party committee 
or government above the county level, eventually 
audited and passed by the related department. During the 
process, to what extent can be the role of public play is 
not clearly defined. As is mentioned above, the result of 
performance assessment is the main basis for rewarding 
the civil servant. Nonetheless, it is unable to reflect 
comprehensively the working performance of the civil 
servant. So, during the actual operation, the rewarding 
of civil servant is very arbitrary and bad phenomenon, 
like excessive rewarding and bad intension of seeking 
loopholes, may occur.
(b) The implementation of the reward or punishment 
mechanism mainly depends on the internal administration 
system. In order to make it easier, this paper makes a clear 
distinction on the discipline of action that violets the law 
or discipline and the discipline of illegal administration.
The article 66 in Chinese Administrative Procedure 
Law stipulates that, in the process of people’s court 
handling administrative case, they shall send the 
related material into supervisory institutions, related 
administrative institutions or the higher administrative 
institutions once they find the head officer or director 
leader violets the law or discipline; they shall also send 
the related material into police station or procuratorial 
institution if they find the head officer or director leader 
commits crime. In reality, however, it is extremely hard 
for the judge to convict the civil servant or head officer 
of the illegal administration. The main reason is that 
there is little clue for the crime or illegal administration. 
Even plaintiff can reflect the related problems, there is 
no evidence to investigate the problems since the duty 
of investigation and verification lie in the discipline 
inspection authorities. So the court seldom sends the 
civil servant who severely commits the crime or illegally 
administrates into the related institution. 
According to the 24th article of the Inspection Law of 
Administration of the People’s Republic of China and the 
34th article in the Punishment Ordinance for Civil Servants 
Working in Administrative Organs, the punishment of 
the illegal acts of civil servants shall be decided by the 
appointing institution or the administrative supervision 
institution.
According to Article 16 in State Compensation Law, 
the civil servant is allowed to be free of responsibility 
within certain range. In reality, the people who negatively 
claims for their loss since the inter-relationship among the 
compensation authority, civil servant and administrative 
leader as well as the lack of the supervision institution on 
claiming for the compensation. This is called as “dormancy 
provision” by academic circle. Some investigations show 
that, during the past 20 years of State Compensation Law’s 
implementation, the compensation fees in 26 provinces 
only accounts for 3% of the total amount of financial 
appropriation. In some regions, zero compensation occurs. 
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It is concluded that the civil servant seldom bears the civil 
liability because of the violation of law or discipline. The 
function and influence of State Compensation Law are 
limited.
According to the Law of Criminal Procedure of 
People’s Republic of China (this law would be shortened 
for the Law of Criminal Procedure in the following), it 
is the People’s Procuratorate who exercises the right of 
investigation when the civil servant illegally administrates. 
But the illegal administration is hard to detect. Without the 
report or accusation from some stakeholders, the People’s 
Procuratorate usually needs the administrative institution 
to report the case to them, or the discipline inspection 
institution, other supervision institution on administration 
or trial authorities handover the case to them so as to 
places the case of illegal administration on file.
Therefore, the possible punishments resulted from the 
civil servant who violets the law and discipline can be 
classified into three categories:
(a)  The civil servant is considered to violate the law 
and discipline and shall be given due punishment 
or transferred into the People’s Procuratorate 
to carry out further investigation by his or her 
appointed institution, superior institution or 
government in the same level.
(b)  The civil servant is considered to violate the law 
and discipline and shall be given due punishment 
or transferred into the People’s Procuratorate to 
carry out further investigation by the supervision 
institution.
(c)  Judicial  insti tution has the right to give 
disciplinary proposal, or transfer the case into 
the People’s Procuratorate to carry out further 
investigation.
The first category belongs to the self-inspection of 
administration system. In the third category, the judicial 
institution doesn’t have the right to directly punish the 
administrative officer and this institution seldom hands 
over the administrative officer to the other institution. 
Thus this paper excludes this situation. 
In the second category, the supervision institution 
seems to exercise the dependent right of administrative 
inspection.  According to the Inspection Law of 
Administration, however, the supervision institution shall 
be responsible for the government at same-level or higher 
supervision institution and report work to them, it has 
no right to inspect the same-level stuff. So the second 
category and the first category both belong to the self-
inspection essentially. According to The Inspection Law 
of Administration of the People’s Republic of China 
and The Punishment Ordinance for Civil Servants 
Working in Administrative Organs, it is the internal stuff 
in administrative system who decides the punishment 
and degree of the punishment to the civil servant who 
violets the law and discipline. From the stipulation of 
related jurisdiction on supervision and procedures, the 
leader in administrative institution has the right to make 
administrative punishment.
In most cases, the leader will take everything into 
consideration, such as the severe outcome, social impact, 
the hidden reason and intention of the civil servant, 
interpersonal relationship as well as the possible negative 
impact on civil servant’s loyalty, before he makes the 
administrative punishment.
Assuming that the civil servant is equipped with 
corresponding professional capability (excluding one 
extreme condition that the personal disagreements 
may exist among civil servants), perhaps the illegal 
administration is under the arrangement of the leader, or 
for sake of one civil servant’s personal benefit to give 
illegal permission in the exchange of taking bribery. In 
the former condition, the leader will naturally protect 
his subordinates to maintain his authority; In the latter 
condition, the leader will try his best to minimize the side-
effect of his subordinates to safeguard the passion of his 
team according the prevailing rule of absolute purity. 
Thus, it can be sensed that once the civil servant violets 
the law or regulation, it is usually the administrative 
institution who holds the internal responsibility to 
minimize the bad effect on society and public opinion. 
The administrative leader will choose to make decision 
based on the principle of peaceful resolution.
As the illegal administration of civil servant causes 
a certain crime, the administrative leader will follow the 
principle mentioned above. Therefore, excerpt for the fact 
that the victim or stakeholder insists to report or sue the 
civil servant, administrative institution and supervision 
institution may not choose to transfer the case. Therefore, 
the crime of civil servant may not be held responsible.
In summary, the implementation of existing reward 
or punishment mechanism of civil servant mainly 
depends on the internal implementation of administration 
institution or the case-setting and investigation from 
the Procuratorate. Without a sound external supervision 
system, the disciplinary to illegal administrative civil 
servant depends mostly on the upper administrative 
leader.
3.2 The Function of Incentive Mechanism in 
Practice
In the first principal-agent relationship, the civil servant 
occupies an advantage in information collection. The 
administrative institution can hardly observe the whole 
process of civil servant’s administration, but the result of 
it, for example, the increase or decrease of the number 
of illegal administration case. Furthermore, this result 
is not only caused by civil servant. If it is caused by the 
combination of the internal factor of civil servant and 
the external factor, then the external factor observed 
by the administrative institution is extremely hard 
to measure. 
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It has been described in the former chapter that the 
standard in the performance assessment is too general 
and unscientific to reflect the reality since it is easily 
influenced by the human factor. Therefore, the salary, 
promotion and reward or punishment mechanism can 
hardly bring out its due function, thus the incentive 
mechanism of first principal-agent relationship cannot 
bring out its full potentials, which would lead to reverse 
incentive. 
It is worth noting that the administrative leader 
is the important evaluator in any of the incentive 
mechanism mentioned above. It is also mentioned that 
the performance assessment standard of civil servant 
is so general that creates favorable condition for the 
administrative leader to maximize his own benefits. In 
the second principal-agent relationship, the administrative 
leader is not necessarily able to observe the behavior of 
the civil servant, but he can observe whether the result of 
the behavior is in consistent with his intended purpose. 
Meanwhile, the administrative leader will naturally use 
the incentive mechanism for his own benefit, in other 
words, the control and domination over public power will 
be transformed into private power. The administrative 
leader provides the civil servant with corresponding 
incentive according to his own observation. He will assess 
his preferred civil servant as good worker to promote this 
person; on the contrary, he can also assess the disobedient 
civil servant as bad worker to marginalize and suppress 
this person. 
Therefore, in practice, the existing function of incentive 
mechanism is dominated mostly by administrative leader, 
which will become an effective incentive mechanism for 
the civil servant. 
3.3 The Mechanism of Civil Servant’s Illegal 
Administration
The first and second principal-agent relationships co-exist 
in the same administrative institution. When the leader’s 
target and the method of achieving the target are in 
consistent with the original intention of the law, the second 
principal-agent relationship is conducive to the realization 
of the target of the first principal-agent relationship, which 
is good for the effective administration. Otherwise, the 
second principal-agent relationship would be in conflict 
with the first principal-agent relationship. Hence, the 
civil servant would choose the more favorable condition 
for these two incentive mechanism. The following paper 
will apply the method of State Space Model into the real 
practice of civil servant’s rational choice in these two 
principal-agent relationships.
3.4 The Rational Choice of Civil Servant
In the first principal-agent relationship, this paper assumes 
the chosen action of civil servant that is in consistence 
with law as α，the chosen action of civil servant that is in 
consistence with the administrative leader’s expectation as 
α1 (α1∈A and α1≠α one specific chosen act). First of all, 
we analyze the participation constraint of civil servant:
  . (1)
Without the second principal-agent relationship, 
Expression (1) represents the participation constraint of 
the legal administration of agent. 
∫u(s(x(α,θ))g(θ)d(θ)
represents the monetization and non-monetization returns 
of civil servant through legal administration, including 
salary, honor, promotion opportunity. c(α) represents the 
personal cost of legal administration, entailing engaged 
effort, physical and mental pressure. The left side of 
inequality stands for the net income of the chosen act of 
civil servant. –u stands for the possible maximum net 
income that civil servant may gain through the work.
As the second principal-agent relationship exists in 
the administrative institution as well, the participation 
constraint may diverge into two different conditions: 
the participation constraint of legal administration and 
the participation constraint of administration behavior 
that is in consistence with the administrative leader’s 
expectation, the mathematic expressions are:
Administrating according to the law
    (IR)  . (2)
Administrating according to the leader’s will       
 (IR) .   (3)
The left side of the sign≥ represents the net income 
of the agent when he or she chooses the actαorα1. c’(α) 
in Expression (2) represents the additional cost caused 
by disobeying the leader’s will, such as the loss of 
opportunity. When the leader’s will is in consistence with 
the law, c’(α)=0. Otherwise, c’(α)> 0 in Expression (3) 
means the additional benefit gained from obeying the 
leader’s will, such as promotion, or job adjustment to core 
position, u1≥0. When the two principal-agent relations 
exist in the same administrative institution, Expression 
(1) is no longer the participation constraint of the agent, 
either Expression (2) or Expression (3) should be verified 
as correct. Or else no one would be willing to work in 
administrative institution.
Since the second principal-agent relationship is 
developed from the command-obey relationship between 
leader and civil servant and it maybe not known for the 
policy-maker of this institution, the mechanism only fits 
the Expression (1) of participation constraint in the first 
principal-agent relationship. As is mentioned above, the 
incentive mechanism of the behavior chosen by civil 
servant in the first principal-agent relationship, such as 
the reward or punishment, promotion opportunity, is 
determined by the administrative leader. If the leader 
judges that x(α1,θ) is equal to x(α,θ), assuming that 
the behavior chosen by civil servant α1 is equal to the 
personal cost α:
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  =  . (4)
In the second principal-agent relationship, the Expression (4) is linked with Expression (3). It is thus concluded that:
=  .
Because u1≥0, then:
  ?????????? ??????????? ? ????? ? ?? ?????????? ??????????? ? ????
 
. (5)
According to Expression (5), the legal administration of civil servant does not necessarily meet the incentive 
compatible constraint in the second principal-agent relationship, in other words, as α’=α1,
3.5 The Maximized Utility of the Agent
It has been concluded from above that the incentive 
mechanism in the first principal-agent relationship fails 
to function because it can hardly meet the demand of 
the incentive compatible constraint of civil servant. 
It is thus replaced by effective incentive mechanism 
of administrative leader in the second principal-agent 
relationship. It is of little meaning to talk about the 
maximized utility of the administration institution in the 
first principal-agent relationship. Hence, we’ll talk about 
the maximized utility of administrative leader in the 
second principal-agent relationship.
Firstly, if the will of administrative leader is in conflict 
with the law, we need to consider whether the action of 
civil servant that violets the law requires the cost, which 
includes the cost that allures the specific action of the civil 
servant and the possible punishment of the leader.
The existing incentive mechanism dominated by the 
exerts a great impact on its function and becomes the 
administrative leader’s effective incentive to the civil 
servant. To some extent, the administrative leader can 
privatize the public power and take advantage of the 
government resource to reward the civil servant. Under 
this circumstance, the incentive cost of administrative 
leader is zero.
According to Article 35 and Article 36 in Punishment 
Ordinance for Civil Servants Working in Administrative 
Organs, it is decided by the government or national 
congress at the same level to give the discipline of 
dismissal and it is decided by the government at the same 
level and superior government to give administrative 
discipline other than dismissal. Article 37 in Punishment 
Ordinance for Civil Servants Working in Administrative 
Organs stipulates that it is decided by the government 
to give discipline to official cadres in regional national 
government. It can thus be seen that the internal system 
of administration institution dominates the power of the 
discipline to the administrative leader who violets the law 
and discipline. 
If the administrative leader orders the civil servant to 
actα1 and this has caused some damage, the compensation 
institution is negative in claiming for compensation since 
the close relationship among the compensation institution, 
civil servant and administrative leader. As a matter of 
fact, when it comes to some higher-leveled administrative 
leader, it has gone beyond the boundary of this institution. 
Therefore, it is unlikely for the administrative leader to 
order the civil servant to actα1 and bear civil liability.
As is mentioned above, without the report or accusation 
from the stakeholder, the People’s Procuratorate needs 
the administration institution take the initiative to report 
the case or the handover of the case from the discipline 
supervision institution, other administrative supervision 
institution or judicial organ if the administrative leader is 
found to commit severe crime through exercising his or 
her power. 
According to The Constitution and The Organization 
Law of Local Government, the authority institution has 
the extensive right of supervision over administrative 
institution. However, because of the unstandardized 
relationship between the Party and the authority 
institution, the authority institution is always under the 
control of administrative institution, which is hard to 
realize the true supervision. In most cases, the authority 
institution barely takes related legal measure, or adopts 
disciplinary legal supervision over the government. 
To sum up, the chances of administrative leader getting 
severe punishment are slim when the leader commands 
the subordinate to go against the will of the law since 
the possible punishment decision is made by the internal 
administrative institution.
Therefore, we can see that the personal cost of 
administrative leader ordering the civil servant to 
implementα1 is very low. As the condition of participation 
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constraint of the civil servant is met with, the expected 
utility function of the principal transforms from 
(P) 
to        
In the above equation, v’(.) is the expected utility 
function of the administrative leader, and π’(α1,θ) is the 
production function determined by one specific chosen 
actα and stochastic variable θ. Although the administrative 
leader as principal in unable to observe the chosen act of 
civil servant, the leader can observe the productionπ and 
knows the production functionπ” (α1,θ) that can maximize 
the expected utility function. The leader can thus require 
the civil servant to regard the specific production 
functionπ’ (α1,θ) as the purpose of administration and 
give the civil servant due reward according to the degree 
of achievement. 
As a result, win-win strategy is realized since both the 
administrative leader and the subordinates to maximize 
their own benefit and the highest authority of leadership 
is ensured in the internal part of administration institution, 
which gives rise to a new rule of absolutely obeying 
the leadership. This not only fits in the internal part of 
administration institution at one specific parallel level, but 
also at any vertical level of the administration institution. 
CONCLUSION 
Through the analysis of the constraints of the two 
principal-agent relationships in the internal part of 
administrative institution, it is concluded that the existing 
exercise of administrative power belongs to the second 
principal-agent-relationship and the occurrence of illegal 
acts is largely dependent on the leader’s judgment on the 
intension of legislation. 
However, it is a rather complex mechanism to change 
the status quos of the administration power function in 
the second principal-agent relationship and reduce the 
frequency of illegal administration. Firstly, we need to 
further increase the salary of civil servant and improve 
the performance assessment and promotion system. 
Secondly, we need to improve the awareness and ability 
of administrating according to the law. Last but not 
least, we need to intensify the external supervision. The 
ongoing reform of supervision institution may be the best 
way to intensify the external supervision. According to 
the Decision on the Pilot Reform of National Supervision 
System in Beijing, Shanxi and Zhejiang Provinces in 
the 25th meeting of the 12th NPC Standing Committee, 
the future trend of supervision committee will make full 
use of the supervision resources and get rid of the same 
supervision pattern. The supervision committee will 
belong directly to the core power of our nation and are 
endowed with the supervision function of investigation 
and disposal so as to effectively limit power and give due 
punishment to illegal administration of civil servant or 
administrative leader.
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